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ABSTRACT 
Spam as unsolicited e-mail to a large number of recipients is known to become an increasingly disturbing and costly issue 
of electronic business and Internet traffic. Mainly technical-oriented approaches are applied with a focus on blocking, 
filtering, and authentication mechanisms based on the domain name system. They come along with different drawbacks  
and have all low effectiveness in common. The article sketches these approaches, shows its limitations, and proposes an 
account-based approach where the number of e-mails per day and account is restricted.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Spam as unsolicited e-mail to a large number of recipients is known to become an increasingly disturbing and 
costly issue of electronic business and Internet traffic. Companies, non-profit organizations, and individuals 
get this kind of e-mail to an extent that has certainly crossed the border of just being bothersome. For 
example, as of mid-2003 about 83% of the e-mail messages received by Microsoft Hotmail was spam. That 
was around 2.5 billion out of nearly 3 billion messages on a typical day (Microsoft Corporation, 2004). 
Internet service providers (ISP) as well as e-mail receiving organizations have to address a couple of 
times more e-mail messages than necessary by using higher bandwidths, faster hardware, and spam filtering 
software. This eventually leads to additional costs. Moreover, spam binds employees’ attention and time not 
only due to the deleting operation but more due to reading the spam e-mail before classifying it as unsolicited 
mail. All this is reason enough to be concerned about the Internet’s future capability to maintain the unique 
feature of a world-wide, ubiquitous, and cheap communication system. 
Although many very different approaches have been proposed, the main defense strategies implemented 
nowadays are content based filtering and source based blocking mechanisms, heuristics still struggling with 
several problems sketched below. Recently, approaches were proposed where sender authentication bases on 
extended DNS (domain name system) entries. This article describes the main shortcomings of theses 
approaches and motivates an account-based approach against spam. 
. 
2. FILTERING, BLOCKING, AND AUTHENTICATION 
The most important approaches are either legal/regulatory, social, economic, or technical ones. Blocking 
e-mails is a broadly used mechanism where an e-mail passes or is rejected due to the IP address of the 
sending e-mail mail transfer agent (MTA). When e-mail MTAs, sometimes called relays, are known to 
support spamming they are put on a black list and each time an e-mail comes from such an address it is 
blocked. Black lists work more affectively when they are synchronized with their counterparts on other 
servers or stored centrally. Spamhous Block List (The Spamhaus Project, 2004) is an example for an Internet 
service offering a real time block list. Analogously, white lists contain trustful IP addresses. However, black 
lists and white lists suffer from IP spoofing where spamming e-mail MTAs label IP packets with wrong IP 
numbers. Moreover, spammer often change their relays and hence their IP numbers. Blocking whole ISP or 
ESP might be acceptable even when solicited e-mails might be blocked, but blocking whole regions or 
countries can easily lead to a digital divide. 
Recently, grey lists (Harris, 2003) are brought into operation: They take advantage of the fact that 
spamming e-mail MTAs often don’t implement the standardized “resume feature” according to which a once 
rejected e-mail is sent again after some minutes. When during a specific time window the same e-mail arrives 
a second time it may pass.  
While blocking is strictly IP-based, filtering can rely on all e-mail data. If it is restricted to meta data 
mostly found in the header it is called origin-based filtering; this can include the content of the FROM field, 
of the SUBJECT field, or/and the RECEIVED field and even the used character set refering to the sender’s 
country. Unfortunately, these data can be easily spoofed by a spammer, as the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
(SMTP) as the regular Internet mail protocol was not designed to live in a “dirty world”. 
Content-based filtering relies on the body data and often looks for keywords or specific patterns 
characterized by sequences of semicolons and the first 32 non-printing ASCII characters like “CR” (carriage 
return). A well accepted and effective probabilistic content-based filtering approach is Bayesian filtering 
(Provost, 1999; see http://www.niedermayer.ca/papers/bayesian/bayes.html for a good introduction into 
Bayesian basics and networks).  
Blocking as well as filtering suffer from two possible classification failures: “false-negative e-mails” are 
spam e-mails although delivered, false-positive e-mails are  innocent emails that get mistakenly identified as 
spams. The latter ones are probably the most critical ones since important information remains unread. A 
prominent example is the case of the British „House of Commons“ where members didn’t got discussion 
papers regarding the “Sexual Offences Bill” due to a too restrictive filtering mechanism (BBC, 2003). 
Spammers often exploit that the sender’s identification is not mandatory; hence, they spoof the sender’s 
e-mail address. A family of DNS-based (domain name system) approaches has occurred where it is checked 
whether a message that claims to be from buffy@sunnydale.com was actually sent from the 
sunnydale.com organization or not. If not, the mail is a forgery. Each receiving MTA can use the 
extended mail exchange record (MX record) of the sender´s domain in order to verify if the sender´s IP 
address is a valid one attached to the sender´s domain. Reverse MX (RMX) (Danisch, 2003), Designated 
Mailers Protocol (DMP) (Fecyk, 2003), Sender Policy Framework (SPF) (Lentczner and Wong, 2004) 
partially realized and tested by AOL, and Microsoft’s Caller ID for E-Mail (Microsoft Corporation, 2004) 
belong to the most discussed approaches. They aim at authentication of the sending MTA and belong to the 
Lightweight MTA Authentication protocols (LMAP) (Levine et al., 2004). The Anti-Spam Research Group 
(ASRG) of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) hasn’t made a standardization decision yet. 
ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) has just presented  a candidate for a 
new TLD (top level domain), called .mail and proposed by Spamhaus (ICANN, 2004). According to this 
approach, each mail server must be registered with a .mail suffix, i.e. ICANN’s mail server (currently being 
icann.org) would have to be changed into icann.org.mail. Then, the DNS-based approaches are 
set up. 
However, the DNS-based approaches are annulled when Trojan horses, worms, or viruses are embedded 
into unsuspecting client computers (Garfinkel, 2004) and employ the client’s e-mail address, smtp server, and 
its access data. Then, all DNS-based tests succeed. The German IT magazine “c’t” reports that spammer buy 
addresses of computers affected with Trojan horses from people consciously distributing them (Heise, 2004). 
These Trojan horses can serve as spam robots. 
3. AN ACCOUNT-BASED APPROACH 
Another way to prevent spamming is to restrict the number of e-mails per day and account in a way that 
normal e-mail communication is not affected but spammers cannot go on sending junk mail. This addresses 
the need of spammers to send easily a huge number of e-mails, generally millions. In principle, each time a 
user wants to send a queue of e-mails he has to set up a SMTP (simple mail transfer protocol) connection to 
that e-mail server managing the account for his outgoing e-mails. Before accepting an e-mail the server 
checks if the sender has still e-mail credits, i.e. his counter has not reached the limit. If this test fails the 
server rejects the e-mail by sending the reply code “554 Transaction failed” or – even better – a new error 
code “xyz No mail credit available” yet to be defined. If the user has still credits then the e-mail is accepted 
and the counter gets incremented. The counter has to be reset to 0 on midnight or at another fixed time. 
In order to make this approach successfully and effectively work the following requirements have to be 
met: 
 
? fixing an appropriate number of e-mails allowed to be sent 
? providing exceptions for regular e-mail newsletters 
? secure maintenance of counters 
? use of SMTP Service Extension for Authentication (Myers, 1999) 
? demand to set up an e-mail account manually  
 
On one hand the number of e-mails allowed to be sent per day and account must not restrict regular e-
mail behavior, on the other hand it should be chosen as small as possible. Problems may occur in order to 
support regular newsletters, solicited mass e-mail. Exceptions regarding exceeding usual credits have to be 
provided. Either there is no restriction for specific accounts or there are sufficiently high credits arranged. 
Mechanisms for fixing (possibly dynamic) appropriate limits have still to be found. 
The counters must be protected from any unauthorized change, no user shall be enabled to fiddle its 
value. 
Like accounts for incoming mails (POP accounts or IMAP accounts) it is important to protect SMTP 
accounts from unauthorized access as getting e-mail addresses and SMTP server data is no big challenge for 
spammers. With SMTP Service Extension for Authentication (SMTP-AUTH) there is a mechanism for 
authentication and an optional negotiation of a security layer for subsequent protocol interactions. 
Unfortunately, many SMTP servers do not use SMTP-AUTH and are open for everybody (open relays). 
However, SMTP-AUTH allows authentication without negotiation of a security layer. This allows attackers 
to hijack the SMTP connection and send e-mails to the SMTP server before the regular user can close the 
SMTP connection. 
To prevent spammers from sending millions of e-mails it is also necessary to restrict the number of SMTP 
e-mails accounts. Setting up one must not be performed automatically but has to require little manual work, 
e.g. getting a number or word out of a picture provided by the email service provider (ESP) and entering it 
into a submission form to activate the account. This procedure is a visual CAPTCHA process (Completely 
Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) that is implemented by some e-mail 
providers like Yahoo and Hotmail. However, current implementations have been already compromised: Mori 
present an algorithm and program that captures the texts of 92% of Yahoo’s pictures; spammers can exploit 
this weakness and finally set up an arbitrary number of e-mail accounts automatically. Another attack at 
visual CAPTCHA processes proceeds as follows: the spammer puts the ESP’s picture on his own web site 
and asks users to read the text and enter it in a text field manually to gain access to adult information. The 
spammer puts the text field’s content in the corresponding text field of the ESP’s form. All this can be done 
automatically. 
Provided that the requirements above are met, let 200 be the number of e-mails that can be sent from an 
account per day, then a spammer would have to set up 5000 e-mail accounts manually in order to send one 
million e-mails, a quantity that is common for spammers. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Current approaches against spam e-mails and their coaction have not shown satisfying effectiveness. An 
account-based approach restricting the number of e-mails per day and account might help to improve this 
dilemma by also preventing attackers from spamming from infected computers. However, there is much 
detailed work to do regarding conceptualization and implementation. The Institute of Business Information 
Systems of the RWTH Aachen University is currently developing such a (spam prevention) approach where 
e-mail clients remain unaffected and only little modifications of e-mail protocols are necessary. 
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